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REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
by Mortimer Sellers*
Two hundred years ago, in the wake of the modem world's first
great republican revolutions in France and the United States, Immanuel
Kant endorsed a federation of independent republics as the only valid
basis of international law.' Kant's federation echoed the new federal
Constitution of the United States, which guaranteed a "republican form of
government" to every state in the Union.' Enlightenment scholars supposed that if ever some powerful people could form a republic, republican
principles would become the basis of a just world order.3 So republican
ideas permeated and inspired the developing jus gentium,4 and several
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1.
IMMANIJEL KANT, ZUM EWIGEN FRIEDEN 10 (Stuttgart ed., 1993). "Die blrgerliche
Verfassung in jedem Staate soil republikanisch sein." Id. at 10. "Das V61kerrecht soil auf einen
F~deralism freier Staaten gegralndet sein." Id. at 16.
2.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
3.
E.g., KANT,supra note 1, at 19: "Denn wenn das Gluck es so fifgt: dass ein machtiges
und aufgeklirtes Volk sich zu einer Republik (die ihrer Natur nach zum ewigen Frieden geneigt sein
muss) bilden kann, so gibt diese einen Mittelpunkt der fderativen Vereinigung ffir
andere Staaten ab,
urn sich an sieanzuschliessen und so den Freiheitszustand der Staaten gemAss der Idee des
V6lkerrechts zu sichern und sich dutch mehrere Verbindungen dieser Art nach und nach immer weiter
auszubreiten."
4.
See also, HENRY S. MAINE, ANctENr LAW 55-58 (1983); Pages 73-96 contain discussion on jus gentium; cf.CICERo, DE OFFICUS Il.viii, m.v-vi, ll.xvii, 69 (C. Atzert ed., 1949). See
also Nicholas G. Onuf, Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the Fate of Republicanism, 88 AM. J.INr'L
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new states emerged to embrace the republican form of government. This
paper argues that international law still depends on republican principles
for its content and moral validity, and that purportedly international laws
and institutions bind and should influence republican governments only to
the extent that they reflect republican procedures of politics and legislation.s
The argument has ten parts. Part I defines republicanism as service
to the common good. Part II endorses the republican tradition of finding
the common good through popular sovereignty and the self-determination
of peoples. Part 11 shows the influence of popular sovereignty and republican doctrine on the development of international law. Part IV reconciles
popular sovereignty with regional federalism and international institutions.
Part V defends the national basis of traditional international law. Part VI
recognizes fundamental human rights as necessarily universal and international in application. Part VII endorses "peoples" as the basis of nations
and international law. Part VIII explains the position of minorities within
nations. Part IX identifies republican principles as the basis of international law. Part X proposes republicanism as the test of all international
organizations and legal institutions. All ten sections support the conclusion that republican doctrines have driven the law of nations from the
beginning and should continue to do so if international law is to have any
moral influence or actual impact on the world's structures of legal and
political power.

I. REPUBLICANISM
Kant's famous essay on perpetual peace proposes three basic principles of republican government: the equal freedom of all members of society, their equal subjection to the legal system, and their equality before
the law.' Kant's conception of "freedom" implies popular sovereignty to

L. 280 (1994).
5.
There is a vast recent literature applying Kant's theories to modem international law:
writings which usually do not enquire too closely into the meaning of the word "republican." See,
e.g., Cecilia Lynch, Kant, the Republican Peace, and Moral Guidance in International Law, 8 ETHICS
& INT'L AFF. 39 (1994); Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of InternationalLaw, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 53 (1992); Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFE. 205, 323 (1993). On the "Kantian Tradition" in international law, see David R. Mapel and Terry
Nardin, Convergence and Divergence in International Ethics, in TRADmONS OF INTERNATIONAL
ETHICS 297-322 (Nardin and Mapel eds., 1992). For a non-Kantian discussion of republicanism in
international law, see Onuf, supra note 4.
6.
"Die erstlich nach Prinzipien der Freiheit der Glieder einer Gesellschaft (als Menschen),
zweitens nach Grundsftzen der AbhAngigkeit aller von einer einzigen gemeinsamen Gesetzgebung (als
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approve all legislation, but not what he referred to as unfettered "democracy."7 Kantian republics employ representation8 and the separation of
powers9 to prevent what Kant saw as pure democracy's natural descent
into despotism and injustice." So Kant's republican "freedom" and "justice" both require equal subjection to laws made and executed with the
people's consent, for the common good, rather than the lawless license of
"wild" and unregulated peoples."
Kant's views reflect an ancient tradition of republicanism that proposes one simple test for legal and political legitimacy: service to the res
publica, or common good of the people.' 2 To support the validity of
their legal regimes, most governments claim to serve justice and the common good. 3 But republicanism also proposes a universal technique for
finding the common good through popular sovereignty: the "imperium
populi" of Livy, Cicero, and Rome.'" Republicans maintain that the best
test of the common good of the people is the public deliberation of elected representatives through institutions designed to protect justice and
reason against factions, corruption, and the private self-interest of individuals or any single section of society. 5

Untertanen) und drittens die nach dem Gesetz der Gleichheit derselben (als Staatsbiirger) gestiftete
Verfassung - die einzige, welche aus der Idee des ursprilnglichen Vertrags hervorgeht, auf der alle
rechtliche Gesetzgebung eines Volks gegrandet sein muss - ist die republikanische." KANT, supra
note 1,at 10-11.
7.
Id.at 13.
8.
"Zu jener aber, wenn sic dem Rechts begriffe gemiss sein soil, geh6rt das
reprasentative system, in welchem allein eine republikanische Regierungsart m6glich, ohne welches
sie (die Verfassung mag sein, welche siewolle) despotisch und gewalttatig ist." Id.at 15.
9.
"Der Republikanism ist das Staatsprinzip der Absonderung der ausfohrenden Gewalt
(der Regierung) von der gesetzgebenden.
Id.at 14.
10.
Id.
11.
Id.at 16.
12.
For a broad overview of the republican legal tradition, see Mortimer N.S. Sellers, Republican Liberty, available in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY 14 (Gabriel Moens and Suri
Ratnapala eds., 1996) [hereinafter "'Republican Liberty"]; MORTIMER N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBuCANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1994) [hereinafter "AMERICAN REPUBuCANISM"]. For bibliographies and (somewhat jaundiced) discussions of recent republican

scholarship, see Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11
(1992); G. Edward white, Reflections on the 'RepublicanRevival': Interdisciplinary Scholarship in
the Legal Academy,6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1994).
13.
See Mortimer N.S. Sellers, The Actual Validity of Law, 1992 AM. J. JURIS. 283 (1992)
[hereinafter "The Actual Validity of Law"].
14.
Mortimer N.S. Sellers, Republican Impartiality, 11 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 273
(1991). For the imperium and maiestas of the people, see MARCUS TULLuIuS CICERO, PHILIPPICAE
IV.4.8; T. LIvIus, AB URBE CONDITA 11.7.7.
15.
See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 126 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987): "A republic... [is] a government in which a scheme of representation takes place," so that
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The republican idenjification of justice as the common good requires
some explanation in light of recent neo-"liberal" theories that would separate the two - theories that assume an "irreducible" pluralism of "comprehensive" conceptions -of moral value. 6 The problem may be largely
semantic. 7 Republicanism identifies the purpose of law and society as
the harmonization of diverse talents and interests so that everyone may
live a worthwhile life. 8 Some suppose that speaking of a "common
good" in this context makes harmony harder to achieve.'9 The republican
premise that justice requires all laws to serve the common good rests on a
conviction that human perceptions of the good can be harmonized through
deliberation, humility, and the careful collective reflection of well-intentioned citizens.2'
This view of human nature leads to the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the republican arguments that support it. People have different
talents and life plans, embracing different perceptions of justice and the
common good. Private interests color human attitudes. Decent humility
requires that citizens defer to a reasonable system for resolving conflicting perceptions of the truth. Republicanism proposes that everyone is
capable of perceiving moral truths. This makes popular sovereignty the
best source of justice. If justice and the common good exist and all people have the capacity to perceive them, then the best route to a just society will be through public deliberation. To exclude any voices from the

"the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves." Cf. Montesquieu, who also considered the
structure of the suffrage as fundamental in a republic. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE LA BRtDE
ET DE MoNTESQuiEU, DE L'-SPRIT DES Lois, 12-17 (Gonzague Truc ed., 1949).
16.
Most influentially see John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
OXFORD AMNESTY LEcruRi
1993, 41 (Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley eds., 1993) [hereinafter
"The Law of Peoples"]. Cf JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter "PoLtICAL
REPmUBCAmSM"].
17.
Rawls, for example, now endorses "a common good conception of justice" in The Law
of Peoples, supra note 16.
18.
See, e.g., MARcuS TuLLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA,(Harv. Univ. Press eds., 1988).
"res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo congregatus, sed
coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus." CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, supra
note 18, I.xxv.39. "Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et
universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio." CICERO, DE OFFiCuiS, supra note 4, IIl.vi.26.
19.
This would seem to be the worry of John Rawls when he refuses to speak of "truth"
about justice. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 16; John Rawls, Reply to
Habermas, XCII J. OF PHIL. 132, 150 (1995) [hereinafter "Reply to Habermas"].
20.
See, e.g., Sellers, Republican Impartiality, supra note 14. Consensus and compromise
will be more easily achieved in search of the common good than in pursuit of even "rational" selfinterest.
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public debate would deprive society of their insights and subject some
private interests to the domination of others. Deference to a balanced
system of public deliberation in search of the common good helps citizens
to test private perceptions of justice, which may be wrong, and to obtain
public cooperation when their perceptions are correct.2'
Kant's three basic republican constitutional principles repeat the
standard desiderata of republican political liberty as listed in John
Adams's Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States
of America, which required subjection to "equal laws by common consent" for the "general interest, or the public good" of the people.22 But
Kant also suggests that this republican constitution should serve as the
basis of international law and world peace.23 Similar republican principles have driven the development of the law of nations, at least since the
late eighteenth century, and should continue to do so, with greater openness, now that the Soviet and other empires have receded as threats to international peace and justice.
II. SELF-DETERMINATION

The republican principle of popular sovereignty is implicit in the
' This
widely-recognized right to the "self-determination of peoples."24
principle gained international prominence in 1776 with the United States
Declaration of Independence, asserting the right of peoples to "alter or
abolish" forms of government that deny fundamental human rights. To
remedy the "abuses and usurpations" of George III, the United States
claimed their "separate and equal" station among nations.' Woodrow
Wilson renewed this republican conception of popular self-determination
during World War I with his assertion that "every people has a right to
choose the sovereignty under which they shall live," and that "no peace
can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the

21.
22.

Id.

JOHN ADAMs, 1 A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 23 (London, 1787).
23.
KANT, supra note 1, at 16-20.
24.
For the origins of the concept of self-determination, see ALFRED COBBAN, THE NATION
STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION (1969); ICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN
LAW AND PRACICE (1982); Dov RoNEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION (1979) [hereinafter
"SELF DETERMINATION IN LA AND PRACTICE"]; A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION (1973).
25.
THE UNANIMOUS DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, July

4, 1776.
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governed."'26 Finally, the "self-determination of peoples" achieved widespread formal recognition in Articles 1 and 55 of the United Nations
Charter. 7
The concept of self-determination rested from the beginning on two
related assumptions: first, that all people are free and equal individuals
without whose consent no legitimate national legal system can exist; and
second, that all peoples should constitute free and independent states
without consent of which no legitimate international legal system can exist. When Emmerich de Vattel first delineated the modem law of nations
in 1758, he began with these twin assumptions, which supported his assertion that nations, being composed of free and independent individuals,
should likewise be free and independent from each other except to the
extent that they consent to mutual restrictions.s International law has
always drawn strength and recognition from this powerful analogy between individual liberty and the liberty of states.29 When citizens lose
their freedom, this rationale loses its force.
Because of the support that republican principles give to their freedom of action and commercial well-being, non-republican governments
have accepted republican doctrine in international instruments. Kant observed that mutual self-interest eventually creates republican institutions
even among tyrants, who seek controls against their common depravity. 3'
Conquest and consolidation are the greatest enemies of international justice because they destroy the balance of power between states and lead to
universal monarchy. 3 This explains Kant's fifth preliminary article of
perpetual peace - that no state should forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state.32 Even despots can agree to this
26.
Woodrow Wilson, quoted in Michla Pomerance, The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives of the Wilsonian Conception, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1976) [hereinafter "Perspectives of the Wilsonian Conception"].
27.
"[The Purposes of the United Nations are] to develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principles of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2. Art. 55 of the U.N. Charter further states: "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples."
28.
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DRorrS DES GENS, oU, PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE,
APPLIQUES A LA CoNDurrE & Aux AFFAIRES DES NATIoNs & DES SOUVERAINS, Preliminaries, § 4
(Londres, 1758).
29.
See, e.g., The Law of Peoples, supra note 16.
30.
"Die Natur will unwiderstehlich dass das Recht zuletzt die Obergewalt erhalte." KANT,
supra note 1, at 32. "durch den wechselseitigen Eigennutz..." Id. at 33.
31.
"Universal Monarchic." Id. at 32.
32.
"Kein Staat soll sich in die Verfassung und Regierung eines andern Staats gewaltttig
einmischen." Id. at 6.
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provision, which protects them against each other, although not against
republican revolution when their peoples are ripe for rebellion.33 Kant
also insisted that the individual rights of humanity must be held sacred,
however great a sacrifice this may require of the ruling elite.34
Most states now recognize the right to self-determination through
two international covenants. The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights confirms the right of "all peoples" to "selfdetermination" and "freely" to "determine their political status."35 The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights begins with exactly
the same words,36 but goes on to assert individual "liberty" and "security
of person."37 Both Covenants reflect the United Nations General
Assembly's earlier Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which endorses the right of every person "to take part in the government of his country" and to vote in "periodic and genuine elections" by "equal suffrage"
and "free voting procedures."3 Numerous non-republics have endorsed
these republican principles, giving republics and republican scholars a
powerful rhetorical advantage against tyrants and despotic elites.39 Arbi-

33.
"Dahin wflrde nicht zu ziehen sein, wenn ein Staat sich durch innere Veruneinigung in
Zwei Teile spaltete, deren jeder fijr sich einen besondem Staat vorstellt, der auf das Ganze Anspruch
macht; wo einen derselben Beistand zu leisten einem aiissem Staat nicht fOr Einmischung in die
Verfassung des andern (dean es ist alsdahn Anarchie) angerechnet werden K6nnte." Id. at 7.
34.
"Das Recht der Menschen muss heilig gehalten werden, der herrschenden Gewalt mag
es auch noch so grosse Aufopferung Kosten." Id. at 49. Cf Eugene Kamenka, Human Rights, Peoples
Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 129 (Crawford ed., 1988) for the republican sources of modem
rights discourse in Commonwealth England, France, and the United States of America. Kamenka
rightly notes that all "liberal democracy" grew out of republican tradition.
35.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Part
1, art. 1.1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) [hereinafter "ICESCR"j.
36.
"All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, Part 1, art. 1.1, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [hereinafter "ICCPR"].
37.
ICCPR art. 9, para. 1.
38.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (I1), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948).
39.
For discussions of the modem concept of self-determination, see HuRST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGrrS
(1990); POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION INLAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 24; Pomerance, Perspectives of the Wilsonian Conception, supra note 26, at 1; Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) [hereinafter "Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance"]; Thomas M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES
AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Broelmann et al. eds., (1992) [hereinafter "Postmodern
Tribalism"]; Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE
J. INT'L L. 177 (1991); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AM. J.INT'L L. 304, 304-310 (1994).
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trary regimes accept such Covenants because of the support they hope to
draw from the United Nations' corresponding endorsement of the
"sovereign equality of all its members,"' and their "political independence."' 4' The United Nations Charter expressly refuses to authorize intervention in matters that are essentially within the sovereign "domestic"
jurisdiction of any independent state.42
III. SOVEREIGNTY
The sovereign independence and equality of states received its most
influential endorsement and elaboration from Emmerich de Vattel, who
based his argument on republican principles of freedom and equality.43
Since all men are naturally equal, with equal rights and obligations proceeding from nature, Vattel argued, so must nations comprised of men be
equal also, and inherit from nature the same obligations and rights. The
relative power or weakness of states makes no difference. "A dwarf is as
much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than
the most powerful kingdom."" Vattel added that the natural "liberty and
independence of nations" gives all peoples the right to be governed as
they see fit, and that no state may legitimately interfere in another state's
government. "Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is,
doubtless, the most precious and that which other nations ought most
scrupulously to respect." '
Vattel's national sovereignty belonged originally and essentially to
the people collectively. Nations could subsequently cede sovereignty to a
senate or to a single person,' but only to promote the common good of
all citizens.47 When the nation's chosen sovereign exceeds or abuses this
authority, the nation may reclaim his power, as the Netherlands withdrew
sovereignty from Philip II of Spain.' Other states justly support such
revolutions, in which nations take up arms against their oppressors. Vattel
praised William of Orange and the Dutch for intervening to support the
English revolution against James HI. It was "an act of justice and gener-

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

U.N. CHARTER art.
2, para. 1.
Id. art. 2, para. 4.
Id. art. 2, para. 7.
VATTEL, supra note 28, Preliminaries, § 4.
Id., Preliminaries, § 18, as translated in the Fourth Edition (London, 1811).
Id. at l1.vi.54.
Id. at I.iv.38.
Id. at I.iv.39.
Id. at I.iv.51.
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osity" to defend foreign liberty.49
Jean Bodin had earlier made the often repeated argument that sovereignty should be the absolute, indivisible and perpetual power of kings.5 0
Monarchs have tended to promote this doctrine, which left its residue in
Hugo Grotius's curious defense of slavery and a nation's power to bind
itself in perpetual servitude.5 (Since some peoples are unfit to be
free.)52 Grotius denied the republican doctrine of popular sovereignty,
observing that no nation had ever allowed women, minors, or paupers to
join in public debate. 3 As husbands govern wives,54 and masters rule
slaves," so kings may own nations, to avoid the turbulence of uncertain
jurisdiction.56 These proto-Hobbesian arguments and assumptions would
not be made openly today. 7 But they survive in the modern doctrine of
non-intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of "sovereign" governments,5" as interpreted by some contemporary commentators on international law.59 Yet even Bodin admitted the right of intervention in a
state's formerly internal affairs, when the state's sovereign oppresses his
subjects,' and Grotius fully recognized the equivalence between slavery
and regal sovereignty while nevertheless excusing both.6
"But we ought not to abuse this maxim, and make a handle of it to authorize odious
49.
machinations against the internal tranquillity of states." Id. at nl.iv.56.
JEAN BODIN, SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE, 1.8-11.5 (1586).
50.
"Atque hoc loco primum rejicienda est eorum opinio, qui ubique & sine exceptione
51.
summarn potestatem esse volunt populi, ita ut eireges, quoties imperio suo male utuntur, & coercere
& punire liceat quae sententia quot malis causam dederit, & dare etiamnum possit, penitus animis
recepta, nemo sapiens non videt. Nos his [sic] argumentis earn refutamus. Licet homini cuique se in
privatem servitutem cui velit addicere, ut & ex lege Hebraea & Romana apparet. [Q]uidni ergo populo sui juris liceat se uni cuipiam, aut pluribus ita addicere, ut regendi sui jus in eum plane transcribat,
nulla ejus juris parte retenta?" HuGO GROTIUS, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libritres, in 1 THE CLASSICS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 52-53 (James Brown Scott ed. 1913).
Id. at 53 (citing Aristotle).
52.
53.
Id. at 53.
54.
Id. at 55-56.
55.
Id. at 56.
56.
Id. at 57.
Cf.Mortimer N.S. Sellers, Republican Authority, V THE CANADIAN J.L. & JuRIs. 257,
57.
259-60. "And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their person from him that
beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 11.18.1
(Dutton, 1973).
58.
E.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of The United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N.GAOR, 1883rd plenary mtg, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (1970).
59.

E.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch. 13 "Sovereign-

ty and Equality of States." (3d ed. 1979).
60.
BODIN, supra note 50, 11.5 at 609.
61.
In addition to the passage quoted above, see GROTIUS, supra note 51, at 490-94, in
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The concept of "sovereignty" entered the lexicon of international law
through the obvious analogy between free men and free states. Some
nations, as Grotius observed, are subject to others: they have no freedom
or sovereignty.62 "Sovereignty," in this sense, means independence from
any other human will,63 just as "liberty," in its original republican sense,
meant independence from the will of another. 4 People are not free when
subject to any power but the common good. Nations are not sovereign
when subject to the will of any other person or state.
Vattel's argument for strict national sovereignty and the rigorous
independence of states rested on this analogy between personal and national freedom. When Vattel was writing in the mid-eighteenth century,
personal freedom hardly existed outside Switzerland and the Netherlands.
At that time, it made sense for enlightened and well-meaning authors to
establish an absolute principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of
sovereign states. The most likely interventions of Vattel's era would have
curbed emerging popular sovereignty. Similarly, even after the French and
American revolutions, preponderant power remained in the hands of European despots. Relatively progressive states, such as Britain, promoted
non-intervention in defense of nascent continental liberty, as in Naples
and Spain, against reactionary European monarchs.65 The United States
also embraced non-intervention to protect itself and other recently liberated American republics against the reimposition of European autocracy in
the New World.' But the emergence of the United States as a world
power altered this equation, and many republics now have the strength to
protect foreign liberty, without endangering their own democratic institutions or national independence.
The fundamental republican principle of popular sovereignty ("imperium populi") has been at the core of the developing law of nations from

which Grotius admits that slavery violates the law of nature, and the barbarity of inherited servitude.
62.
GROTIUs, supra note 51, at 54.
63.
"[S]umma [potestas] autem illa dicitur, cujus actus alterius juri non subsunt, ita ut
alterius voluntatis humanae arbitrio irriti possint reddi." Id. at 52.
64.
E.g., ALGERNON SIDNEY, DIscouRsES CONCERNING GovERNmENT 1.5 (London, 1698):
"For as liberty solely consists in an independency upon the will of another, and by the name of slave
we understand a man, who can neither dispose of his person nor goods, but enjoys all at the will of
his master, there is no such thing in nature as a slave, if those men and nations are not slaves, who
have no other title to what they enjoy, than the grace of a prince, which he may revoke whensoever
he pleaseth." See, e.g., Sellers, Republican Liberty, supra note 12.
65.
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Part II, §§ 65-66 (Legal Classics Library ed., 1991).
66.
See, e.g., President Monroe's message to Congress of December 2, 1823, the so-called
"Monroe Doctrine."
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the beginning. Freedom and equality are the two best rules of human
relations and such obvious sources of just and stable political institutions,
that even tyrants have recognized liberty and independence among themselves while denying both to their terrified subjects. "Sovereignty" denotes the freedom and equality of governments. Just as legitimate national
governments derive their authority from the consent of the governed, so
legitimate international institutions derive their validity from the consent
of the governments involved. If rational debate among citizens produces
just national laws, so too should rational discussion among governments
produce a just global order. But this supposes that governments speak for
the nations they rule. The very rationale that supports the sovereign
equality of states implies the sovereign equality of citizens, too. Republican principles would deny despotic governments the right to speak for the
peoples they control. Every state's claim to a national voice depends on
its being, in fact, the voice of the nation.
IV. FEDERALISM

Why divide the world into nations at all? Kant proposed to build
international law around a "federation of free states." 7 But he opposed
creating a world republic, despite the value of size and diversity in preventing local injustice. Why not create a cosmopolitan republic and abolish the need for a separate law of nations? Kant explained that laws lose
influence as governments increase in territory, producing anarchy or despotism.' This repeats a standard criticism of large republics. In small
republics, the common good is better known and closer to each citizen.69
Throughout the world, geographic, linguistic, and religious differences
divide people into natural units. Federal institutions allow each community to control the others' excesses in the interests of all. Kant praised this
balance as nature's own design for creating and protecting a just law of
nations.7"

67.
"Das V61kerrecht soil auf einen F6deralism freier Staaten gegrandet sein."
KANT, supra
note 1, at 16. (emphasis added).
68.
Id. at 32.
69.
"II est de lanature d'une r6publique qu'elle n'ait qu'un petit territoire... Dans une
grande republique, le bien commun estsacrifi6 A mille considerations; ilest subordonn6 A des exceptions; ild6pend des accidents. Dans une petite, lebien public est mieux senti, mieux connu, plus pits
de chaque citoyen..." DE SEcONDAT, supra note 15, VIII.16. Cf JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, Du
CoNTRAT SoCIAL, 11.9 & 111.6 (Henrie Guillemin, ed. 1973).
70.
"So wie die Natur weislich die V61ker trennt, welche der Wille jedes Staats und zwar
selbst nach Grunden des V61kerrechts gem unter sich durch List oder Gewalt... " KANT,supra note
1, at 33.
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Federal institutions replicate the benefits of free republican government on an international scale. James Madison emphasized this point for
North America in endorsing the ancient republican technique of balancing
competing factions to counteract local self-interest." John Adams
claimed that a well-balanced republic could exist even "among
highwaymen" by setting each rogue to watch the others. Kant envisioned a successful republic of devils.73 The United States Constitution
first applied this same reasoning to sovereign states, using each state to
control the others, and to provide "a republican remedy for the diseases
most incident to republican government."74'
Even if it were attainable, a world republic would not be desirable
for two important reasons. First, excessively unified international institutions create the risk that one bold usurpation could tyrannize the world, as
happened in imperial Rome, turning the first republic into a universal
empire. Second, peoples facing varied geographical and historical circumstances create different local values from the fabric of local experience.
These values enrich their own lives, but also the cultural and political
capital of their republican neighbors. Each nation provides a model for
the others, and each regional innovation supplies a possible new model
for justice and world peace.
V. NATIONALISM

The obvious existence and possible benefits of national diversity
have encouraged some scholars to embrace a "multinational" conception
of justice, a conception that recognizes no rights or justice beyond each
particular society's inherited traditions and political discourse."' Somewhat less coherently, within nations, this becomes a "multicultural" conception of justice, encouraging the disaggregation of peoples into an overlapping mosaic of ethnic, religious and cultural viewpoints. 6 Some crit-

71.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987): "Ambition must
be made to counteract ambition... And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may
be carried to a very great extent by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle". Id.
at 319, 322. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
72.
ADAMs, supra note 22, at 111.505.
73.
KANT, supra note 1,at 31.
74.
"And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans ought
to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of federalists." THE FEDERALIST
No. 10 (James Madison), at 128.
75.
See, e.g., F. Von Savigny, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit f-r Gesetzgebung und
Rechtswissenschaft (1814); RiCHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
76.
See, e.g., MULTICULTURALISM (Amy Gutmann ed., 2d ed., 1994); WtuL KYMNuCKA,
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ics of nationalism consider this progression inevitable, concluding that
each recognition of national community breeds new claims by smaller
sub-groups, leaving no principled basis for restricting fragmentation, or
eliminating the self-indulgent excesses of tiny local majorities.'I Proponents of the nation as a viable category must offer a rationale for dividing
jurisdiction, not only between nations, but between national and international law.
Some scholars have opposed the republican principle of popular
sovereignty to a "liberal" principle of human rights." This misreads the
basis of the republican imperium populi, which exists to serve justice and
the common good, not private inclinations. Human rights are best discovered through public deliberation - not created, but found. Republicans
do not deny the existence of universal human rights. They offer a technique for finding them - through representation, the rule of law, the
separation of powers, and the ultimate sovereignty of the people.' Republicans hold that there can be no liberty without popular sovereignty,
while recognizing that popular sovereignty alone does not guarantee justice."
Scholars create a dangerous confusion when they oppose republican
popular sovereignty to liberal human rights. Democracy may threaten
liberty, but liberty and republicanism begin and must end together.8 ' The
value of popular sovereignty in republican theory lies in finding the common good. Liberty is the product of this search. So Benjamin Constant
made a fatal innovation in opposing the "liberty of the ancients," which
he identified with democracy, to the "liberty of the modems," individual
human rights.8 2 Neither is possible without the other. Popular sovereignty discovers liberty. Human rights protect the search for justice.

LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE

(1989).

77.
See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, PANDAEMONIUM: ETHNiCITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993).

78.
See, e.g., Jirgen Habermas, Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and
Republican Versions, 7 RATIO JuRIs 1 (1994); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988).
79.
See SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM, supra note 12, at 244 et passim for the traditional desiderata of republican government.
80.
Republicans have always been very careful to distinguish their constitution from democracy. E.g., CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, supra note 18, at lI.xiii.41; SIDNEY, supra note 64, at
11.16.30; THE FEDERALIST, Nos.10 and 14; KANT, supra note 1, at 13.
81.

LiViUS, AB URBE CONDITA, supra note 14, U.1; see Sellers, Republican Liberty, supra

note 12.
82.
(1819).

BENJAMIN CONSTANT, DE LA LIBERT DES ANCIENS COMPARtE A CELLE DES MODERNES
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Self-governing nations provide a locus for establishing individual
human rights. But too much emphasis on universal human rights may
obscure the primary value of the nation, which lies in the continuity and
large common projects that nations make possible over generations in the
lives of their citizens. Human rights could be protected in a world republic, but collective identity could not. Human nature thrives best in an
atmosphere of common endeavor and shared purpose among neighbors.
Republican nations exist to serve this basic human need, which individual
human rights alone leave unfulfilled. Shared devotion to human rights and
constitutional procedures preserve neither internal peace, nor a stable
national identity. There must be common culture too, developed to embrace all members of society. 3
Peoples respect each other's sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction
for two important reasons, republican and prudential, both of which have
contributed to the privileged position of nations in international law. The
republican reason depends on popular sovereignty within nations, which
requires the deference of outsiders towards a people's own determinations
of its cultural and political future. The prudential reason encourages republics to assert independence and equality against non-republican states,
so that they may protect their own internal liberties against outside intervention. Sometimes this requires establishing a modus vivendi with despotic regimes in order to preserve the republic intact. Prudence may tolerate tyranny, but does not justify it. Republics properly protect the liberty
and human rights of other nations when they have the power to do so.
There is a limit to the autonomy popular sovereignty accords to self-,
governing republics. Each nation is a community unto itself, but only for
the old republican purposes of creating a "common sense of justice" and
a "partnership for the common good."" Other republics, or, better still, a
federation of republics, may legitimately intervene when governments or
majorities exceed the scope of their national authority. Total deference to
the popular will would subvert the fundamental republican principle of

83.
Most critics of the nation-state fear its unifying force in the hands of tyrants. Even
Jdrgen Habermas, who sees the importance of nationalism in Europe's emerging republican sensibility
and the value of common identity in protecting universal human rights, does not understand how
weak civic bonds will be without a national identity to support them. See Jirgen Habermas, The European Nation State-4ts Achievement and Its Limits: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and
Citizenship, in CHALLENGES TO LAW AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY. Papers and Abstracts of
the 17th IVR World Congress Bologna 27 (1995).
84.
"Respublica res est populi. Populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo
congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis juris consensu, et utilitatis communione sociatus." CICERO, DE
RE PUBLICA, supra note 18, at I.XXV.39.
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liberty. Democracy may violate the common good as well as any other
system. Thus, the United States Constitution guarantees each constituent
commonwealth not only a "republican form of government,""5 but also
"liberty" (and certain named liberties) against popular intemperance.86
Public deliberation is the best test of the common good, and a nation's
voice is best expressed by the vote of its people. But international laws
and institutions exist in part to extend popular sovereignty and public
deliberation to a broader arena, and so to prevent national governments
from abusing their power.
Kant observed that history divides humanity into natural republics 7
and agreed with Montesquieu, Rousseau, and many others that republics
should remain small to keep the common good within reach of all citizens.88 As nations become smaller, their homogeneity increases. This
makes it easier to build a common culture, adapted to regional history or
geography, and to develop the collective social projects that enrich communal life. 9 But it also makes it easier for local majorities and factions
to control the state and oppress their fellow citizens. 9 National republics
are the natural locus of positive liberty, cultural continuity, and communal
solidarity. National republics enrich their citizens' lives and defend them
against outside attacks. But republics may not always adequately protect
their people's negative liberties against the state.
VI. HUMAN

RIGHTS

Many governments now recognize fundamental human rights as one
essential basis of a just world order, as affirmed by the Charter of the
United Nations, 9 whose members have agreed to promote "universal

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
Id. art. 1,§ 10; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
KANT, supra note 1, Erster Zusatz: Von der Garantie des eigen Friedens.
"Ii est de ia nature d'une r publique qu'elle n'ait qu'un petit territoire..." DE
SECONDAT, supra note 15, at 11; "plus I'ttat s'agrandit, plus la libert6 diminue." ROUSSEAU, supra
note 69, at 11.9, 111.1.
89.
CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1991); MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:
85.
86.
87.
88.

WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988).

"The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests,
90.
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression." See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra
note 15.
...
to reaffirm faith in fundaThe Preamble to the United Nations Charter states:
91.
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small."
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respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The
United Nations General Assembly specified some of these rights in its
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,93 and many governments
have ratified the 1966 International Covenants on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, and Civil and Political Rights.' Along with popular
sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples (both endorsed in the
Declaration and Covenants), non-republican governments have accepted
the universality of other human rights, perhaps assuming perpetual nonenforcement and governmental impunity.95 Tyrannies buy respectability
by recognizing the obvious rights of humanity.
The international human rights covenants make a useful distinction
between economic, social, and cultural rights, which states undertake to
"take steps" toward "achieving progressively," and civil and political
rights (including some rights from which there may be "no derogation,"
even if the life of the nation is at stake),' which states undertake to "respect and ensure" immediately.98 Civil and political rights are the rights
without which nations cannot deliberate, self-determination cannot occur,
and popular sovereignty does not exist. They embrace fundamental republican guarantees, including rights to life,99 liberty,"° equality before the
law,"°' and to vote and take part in public affairs."° Economic, social,
and cultural rights are the rights through which nations express their
individuality and cultural traditions. Civil and political rights are the
rights without which no such expressions may authentically be made.
The specific lists of rights established in United Nations documents
lose some authority due to the participation of non-republics in their compilation, participation which may have compromised the content of the
lists. 3 But prominent republics such as France and the United States
subsequently ratified the Covenants through accredited representatives of

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 38.
See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 35, and ICCPR, supra note 36.
ICCPR, supra note 36.
ICESCR, Part II, art. 2, para. 1.
ICCPR, art. 4, para. 2.
Id. Part 1H,art. 2, para. 1.
Id. art. 6.
Id. arts. 8, 9.
Id. arts. 14, 26.
Id. art. 25.
Cf Kamenka, supra note 34, at 127, 135.
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the respective nations.' All the world's leading republics have composed similar lists, including the United States Bill of Rights, and the
French Diclarationdes droits de l'homme et du citoyen, both of which
were formally ratified after comprehensive public deliberation. Such lists
mark the rational limits of governmental power, even in republican states,
against a nation's own citizens. Broad public deliberations and planning
in the abstract against future unknown circumstances sought to control the
people and their governments in defense of individual rights while empowering the nation to pursue its collective social and cultural goals with
a minimum of foreign intervention.
International law earns whatever validity it has by protecting justice
and the common good of humanity. To remain a useful concept, the law
of nations must demonstrate both the value of nations as a category, and
the reasons why nations should sometimes be subject to the law. Nations
derive their usefulness and domestic jurisdiction first from their actual
existence and second from their value in mediating the popular sovereignty of geographically distinct peoples. International law becomes useful in
policing the boundaries of this authority. Thus international law has three
main purposes: first, to protect each nation's sovereignty and self-determination against external and internal threats; second, to protect the human
rights of all citizens against their own people's excessive social unity or
democratic enthusiasm; and finally, to advance the common good of all
nations, where collective action is necessary.
VII. PEOPLES

Republican governments exist to advance the common good of the
people, 5 and republican institutions rest on the imperium populi, or
sovereignty of the people;" 6 therefore, applying republican principles to
international law requires identifying the relevant "peoples" and jurisdictions involved. Which groups deserve "equal rights" and "self-determination" as peoples"' who may "freely determine their political status" and

104. The United States signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights on October 5, 1977. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was also signed
on October 5, 1977 and ratified on April 2, 1992. CCH Cong. Index vol. I, Senate 102 Cong., Sess.
1991-1992. France signed both the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on January 29, 1981. 1981 J. Republique
Francais 405.
105. See above and the famous quote from Cicero, "Respublica est res populi" quoted in
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 22, vol. I, xxi.
106. See CICERO, PHtLIPPICAE, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
107. E.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 55 and art. 1, para.2.
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"freely pursue their economic social and cultural development? ' °0 State
practice and public debates often assume that "peoples" are "nations" and
that "nations" are "states."'"1° Leading scholars have deplored this "confusion" of peoples with nations as improperly going over the heads of
states to their subordinate populations.1 But republican principles, etymology, political history, and the use of the term "peoples" in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations"' all imply that the relevant
"peoples" in international law are the citizens of a given state" 2 and that
these citizens ought to constitute a nation, which should control the state
(imperium populi). "People," "nation," and "state" will not be separated in
any just and stable system of international law.
The term "people" or "populus" properly refers to the citizens, or
subjects, of a given state. The people's state becomes a republic when
citizens come together to create a common sense of justice in pursuit of
the common good."' This also makes them a nation, when the republic
persists over time. Republics, therefore, are states in which citizens have
created a nation by establishing a common culture under the sovereignty
of the people. But not all states are republics, and not all nations are
states. In the absence of republican government and shared civil rights,
individuals properly develop communal identities around contingent ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic attributes, which determine justice and
the common good among their own members. People need society, and
when the state will not provide it, they find their nations where they can.
The Roman term "natio" originally referred to those persons sharing
a common "natus," or birth." 4 Like the gentes of the original "jus gentiurn" or "law of nations," "natio" first indicated groups not yet integrated
into the political form of a state, held together by common customs and

108. E.g.JCCPR, art. 1, para. 1.
109.
Deploring this fact, see Peter Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In ParticularIndigenous
Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 26 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
110. E.g., Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern InternationalLaw, in THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLES 11 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
11I. U.N. CHARTER, Preamble: "WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS... "
The language consciously echoes the Preamble to the Constitution on the United States of America:
"We the People of the United States .... " and implies all citizens of the republic.
112. The populus, or population.
113. "Respublica res est populi. Populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquo modo
congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis
juris consensu, et utilitatis communione sociatus." CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, supra note 18, at
I.XXV.39.
114. Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, A LATIN DICTIONARY S.v. "natio" 1189 (1879).
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traditions."'5 When Rome conquered the Western world, these
"nationes" offered the obvious boundaries for the new Roman provinces
and remained the basis of local identity in European Christendom, where
medieval universities divided students into "nations" according to the
regions they represented." 6 Nations conceived in this way are
prepolitical entities, but they provide the natural outlines of new states
and republics when old tyrannical, multinational empires break down." 7
People who share a common language and experience offer better foundations for republican cooperation than those who do not. Longstanding
political boundaries provide a better basis for future associations than
newly invented divisions.
The doctrine uti possidetis juris reflects the obvious desirability of
preserving existing political boundaries whenever it is possible to do
so."' But the vagaries of war and empire have created many peoples
that embrace several different ethnic or "national" cultures. For example,
in Africa, the very short history of European empires united disparate
groups without developing strong common identities to support new colonies and provinces. In Europe and Asia, the British, Austro-Hungarian,
and Soviet Empires often shifted large populations between regions to
preserve imperial hegemony. Such circumstances make republican unity
difficult to achieve in many post-imperial successor states. The very colonies that most successfully claimed the "self-determination of peoples" to
advance their autonomy" 9 must now maintain "national unity and territorial integrity"' 2 against their own subjugated minority populations.' The African ("Banjul") Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
affirms that "all peoples" have the "unquestionable and inalienable right
to self-determination ' on a continent that also absolutely affirms the

115. See Habermas, supra note 83, at 28.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 31-32.
118. On uti possidetisjuris, with bibliography, see BROWNLE , supra note 59, at 137-38.
119. See, e.g., the Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (1960) para. 1: "the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights".
120. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
supra note 119, para. 6.
121.
Some claim that there is a logical inconsistency inherent in this behavior. See, e.g.,
David Makinson, Rights of Peoples: Point of View of a Logician, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 75-77
(James Crawford ed., 1988). This need not be the case if all ethnically or otherwise distinct populations do not rise to the level of "peoples." Everything hinges on how boundaries will be drawn between "peoples."
122.

THE AFRICAN ("BANJUL") CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES RIGHTS, ar. 20, para.1
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inviolability of its inherited colonial boundaries."2
Geographic divisions form the nature and future identity of the nations and peoples governed by international law. Republics respect the
self-determination of the nation through popular sovereignty, and their
search for justice and the common good creates national identity over
time, drawing on the cultural capital of all elements among each state's
population, or peoples. States that maintain republican institutions deserve
stable borders to deepen their unity and common purpose through shared
traditions and a common future. Non-republics deny their subjects selfdetermination; this makes the identity of the "people" much more problematic. Geographic features offer obvious boundaries, but subjugated
nations may constitute several possible peoples. Without popular sovereignty to create national consciousness, the "people" lose their common
identity and must define themselves around non-political institutions, such
as race, religion, language, literature, and other sources of ethnicity. 24
The republican principle of imperium populi requires that all peoples
enjoy self-determination and the rights to vote and be elected in genuine
periodic elections by universal equal suffrage." Governments that deny
these rights are not republican and have no legitimate -'-;im either to the
loyalty of their subjects or to recognition by other states or nations. People subject to such governments are not fully "peoples" until they can
express their identity politically. But they may constitute one or more prepolitical nations whose voices would enrich international law, and whose
rights are violated by their usurping masters. The voices of peoples discover the law of nations when "peoples" are the citizens of republican
states, or the suffering subjects of non-republics, crying out against their
oppressors.

(1981).
123.
OAU RESOLUTION 16(1) of July, 1964 declared that "all member states pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence."
124. Jflrgen Habermas deplores the natural cultural unity of republican peoples in the name
of "pluralism" and multicultural diversity. Habermas, supra note 83, at 31-36. Habermas's view overestimates the tenacity of tribal affinities and the dangers of cultural union. Republics naturally and
properly develop a common sense of identity that includes and builds on all the constituent elements
of the population. Habermas and many others have been misled by the recent fluidity of European
borders. Immigrants naturally assimilate over time to republican cultures, while contributing aspects
of their own previous heritage to the common patrimony. Only strong legal encouragement of differences will preserve significant cultural diversity under free and equal republican governments.
125. This principle is reflected in Articles 1 and 25 of the ICCPR (1966).
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VIII. MINORrmES
The equivalence between the world's "peoples" and the citizens of
its various states raises the issue of minority rights. History, warfare, and
migrations have divided the world into cultural units that do not always
directly correspond with existing political boundaries. Even the peoples of
republican states, particularly young states, may find themselves internally
divided with several ethnically or culturally distinct "minority" populations. Minorities are groups within a nation's people who view themselves as in some way separated from the rest of society. Republican
principles of liberty and equality require that such citizens be included in
the "common good" and never denied their natural human rights on the
basis of distinctions such as race, religion, or any other status. 26
Minorities may develop sub-cultures of their own, and should be
allowed to enjoy them without interference by the government or majority
of the people of their state.'27 This has led some politicians and scholars
to equate "minorities" with "peoples." On this theory "nationalities,"
"peoples," "minorities," and "indigenous populations" are all essentially
the same.s This equivalence would undermine the principle of selfdetermination. If every self-defined group in a society constitutes a "people" with a separate right to self-determination, then "self-determination"
becomes an incoherent and ultimately unrealizable ambition. A citizen
may belong to several different cultural minorities, but to only one people. Minorities may be geographically scattered across several states, but
each people should have a territorial state of its own. Minorities may
exclude their fellow citizens and neighbors, but the "people" of a given
state must embrace every citizen. Every people has an imprescriptible and
unalienable separate right to self-determination. Minorities do not.'29
Individual members of minority groups in republican states enjoy
self-determination by virtue of their membership in the larger nation and
participation in its political processes. But what of minorities in non-republics? Such minorities may offer the best foundation for liberating new

126. This principle is recognized by Article 2, para. 1 of the ICCPR (1966).
127. This right has been recognized by Article 27 of the ICCPR (1966).
128. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 110, at 5-6.
129. For an interesting attempt to define the Rights of Peoples, see The Universal (Algiers)
Declaration of the Rights of Peoples (1976) in InternationalLelio Basso Foundationfor the Rights
and Liberties of Peoples, Universal Declarationof the Rights of Peoples (Paris, 1977), art. 5, partially reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 187-89 (James Crawford ed., 1988). See also note 134 below. For documents on autonomy and minority rights, see DOCUMENTS ON AUTONOMY AND MINORITY RIGHTS (Hurst Hannum ed., 1993).
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republican peoples out of existing tyrannies and empires. This is the only
sense in which minorities may properly be seen as equivalent to nations
and peoples in international law. They provide the seeds of nations and
possible origins of peoples when constructing new states out of the ruins
of empire. Their status hinges on the existence (or non-existence) and
protection of fundamental human rights, including civil and political
rights, without distinction as to race, language, or religion." Minorities
denied their civil rights by existing governments
properly move toward
3
secession under customary international law.' '
All subjects of a state have the right to take part in governing their
country. The deliberation and judgment of the people is the only legitimate basis of governmental authority. The people's voice may only be
expressed through universal and equal suffrage in periodic and genuine
elections. These republican truths have all been recognized, even by nonrepublics, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' and United
Nations Covenants. 33 Together they imply the right of minority groups
to secede from the larger political entity when their republican rights are
denied.'34 The rights of minorities should generally be exercised with
respect for the interests of the community as a whole. These rights cannot
authorize impairing the territorial integrity or political unity of a state
unless the state violates its obligations to democratic government or fails
to maintain adequate respect for the human rights and fundamental free5
doms of all.

3

A manifest and continued abuse of governmental power, to the detriment of any section of the population of a state, implicitly recognizes the
victim group as a separate nation." As early as 1920, a Commission of
Rapporteurs reporting to the League of Nations distinguished the case of

130. The central importance of human rights and fundamental freedoms to the equal rights
and self-determination of peoples is reflected in article 55 of the United Nations Charter.
131.

LEE C. BUCHHErr, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978).

132. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, supra note 38, art. 21.
133. ICCPR art. 25.
134.
Cf. HANNUM, supra note 39, at 116.
135. For a lucid expression of these principles see The Universal ("Algiers") Declarationof
the Rights of Peoples (1976), with text and commentary in Antonio Cassese, PoliticalSelf-Determination-Old concepts and New Developments, in UN LAw/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 137 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1979).
136. This was implied by an international tribunal as early as 1920 in the Report of the
International Committee of Jurists entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the task of
giving an advisory opinion on the legal aspects of the Aaland Islands question, League of Nations
OJ. Spec. Supp. 3 at 5 (1920), when it reserved the question of the rights of people under such circumstances.
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Finland, which had been oppressed by Russia, from the Aaland Islands,
which were not suffering persecution by the Finns.'37 The Commission
denied minorities the right to withdraw from the wider communities to
which they belonged, because to have done so would have been "incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity"."'3 The separation of minorities from the State of which they form a
part is an exceptional solution, "a last resort when the State lacks either
the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees" of
fundamental human rights.'39
IX.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law is the law of nations, which is to say the law governing nations, and their political basis in states. It rests on the assumption that the peoples of the world's various states deserve to develop their
separate nations through their own internal self-determination, rather than
collectively under the distant direction of a world-wide empire. The United Nations reflects this commitment to international federalism, as confirmed by the General Assembly in its 1970 Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States,"4 which repeats the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
The Declaration endorses every state's duty to promote the "universal" observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms through "joint
and separate action," and confirms all peoples' right to "seek and receive
support" in pursuit of their national self-determination.' 4' But the General Assembly reiterated that none of these endorsements should be construed "as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember
or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," and

137.
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138.
139.

The Aaland Islands Question, Report Presented to the Council of the League by the
of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B.7.21 (68) 106 (1921).
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Id. For modem recognition of this fundamental aspect of the Law of Nations see e.g.,

HANNUM, supra note 39, at 470-74; BUcHHEIT, supra note 131, at 94 (1978); Ved P. Nanda, SelfDetermination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect, in SELF-DErERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 204 (Yonah Alexander & Robert A.
Friedlander eds., 1980); COBBAN, supra note 24, at 140.
140.
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
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"thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging
to the territory without distinction as to race, creed, or colour."'42
Republican principles maintain that the only morally valid laws are
laws that serve the common good, 43 and that the best technique for
finding the common good requires popular sovereignty and public deliberation." Law's authority, therefore, depends upon its democratic foundations. 5 Several nations, including the United States, have recognized
this as the basis of their domestic legal institutions.'" The doctrines of
sovereign equality and independence among states arose by extension
from the same republican principles that support popular sovereignty
within states. External and internal self-determination recognize this fundamental republican truth. So even in the absence of republican governments, republican principles have dominated the development of international law.
International law derives whatever substance and validity it has from
the democratic deliberation of sovereign nations. No law is valid or binding without republican endorsement. Republics recognize this in their own
institutions. There is no authority greater than the deliberative voice of
the people: vox populi vox dei - "the voice of the people is the voice of
God;"' but only when the people speak through their democratically
elected representatives - "magistratus est lex loquens."' Surprisingly,
non-republican governments frequently recognize these principles in formal international instruments. Popular sovereignty and the self-determination of peoples not only support the law of nations, but they alone legitimately can, and have long been recognized to do so, even among non-republican states.
Republican states and republican statesmen should always apply
republican principles in finding and interpreting international law, as
should anyone seeking justice in international affairs. This method means
disregarding deliberative processes tainted by the excessive participation

142. Id.
143. See Sellers, Actual Valdility of Law, supra note 13, at 283-290.
144. See SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBICANISM, supra note 12; Sellers, Republican Impartiality,
supra note 14, at 273-82.
145. Sellers, Republican Authority, supra note 57, at 257.
146. See U.S. CONST. Preamble, art. 1, art IV.4 and amend. XIV.
147.
See NEAL WOOD, CICERO'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1988) at 126-127, 137146, 165-66, 169. Cf.A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASS[FIED AND ILLUSTRATED, (A. Maxwell

& Son, eds. 1845), Maxim 1: "Salus Populi Suprema Lex," with citations to GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI
PACIS, H1.20.7.1 and MONTESQUIEU, ESPRIT DEs Lois, L.xxvii.23.
148.
MARCUS TuLLiUS CICERO, DE LEGIBUS 111.i.3 (Harv. Univ. Press., ed., 1988).
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of non-republican actors. When federal institutions embrace non-republican participants, as in the American Union just before the Civil War, the
federation's component republics and nations must deliberate within
themselves to determine their proper international responsibilities. This
leaves peoples open to self-deception and self-interest. Broader, international debate will always be desirable, but in the absence of a larger federation of republican states, republics must rely on the largest federation
they can find. Even in the context of republican federations, each nation's
cultural development remains its own internal affair.
Applying republican principles to existing international treaties reveals the best interpretation and the underlying validity of asserted international standards. For example, the Charter of the United Nations properly recognizes the ultimate sovereignty of peoples, and the equal rights
of persons and peoples under the law of nations. 49 The Charter rightly
emphasizes the settlement of disputes by standing rules of justice and
international law,"s with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,'' including the equal rights and self-determination of peoples."'2 But the Charter also protects a private zone of "domestic jurisdiction", which the United Nations shall not reach.5 3 Republican principles reveal the scope of this zone, which does not protect transgressions
against the political rights of citizens or violations of the basic political
rights to national self-determination and fundamental human dignity. 4
Too often lawyers and scholars see the "legalization" of international
questions as requiring a withdrawal from justice toward supposedly "objective" considerations on the model of municipal legal systems influenced by theories of legal positivism. But neither international nor domestic
legal systems deserve obedience unless they serve liberty and the common good. In the absence of any legitimate international legislature, persons and peoples must decide for themselves which standards to apply or
enforce as "international law." Republican principles supply the basic test
of international validity. Lawyers seeking objective standards in international law must look first to popular sovereignty: was the proposed law
endorsed by democratic deliberation? Second, in the absence of deliberation, lawyers should look to fundamental principles: does the law serve
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justice, common welfare, and basic universal human rights? Because they
disregard popular sovereignty, the opinions of despots and non-republican
governments never legitimately play a role in determining international
law, and provide no valid insights into justice or the common good of
humanity.
X. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

International institutions deserve political legitimacy and obedience
only to the extent that they conform to republican standards of popular
sovereignty and pursuit of the common good. All proposed articulations
of international law from Grotius and Vattel to the United Nations Charter have drawn on the republican principles of consent and self-determination to gain moral authority, while at the same time conceding a great
deal to the interests and influence of military power. To give their systems protection, republican theorists accommodate despotic governments.
Despotic governments accommodate, or insincerely recognize, some republican principles in order to give their power a veil of moral authority.
But this remains a contingent modus vivendi, dependent on circumstances
and the balance of military power. Non-republican powers will continue
their abuses when they can. Republican governments should advance the
interests of liberty and popular sovereignty whenever possible. The actual
legitimacy and moral force of international institutions depend upon their
republican foundations. Republics may defer to non-republican international institutions, but only when they judge it to be in the best interests
of justice and liberty to do so.
Applying republican principles to the United Nations Organization
and some of its dependent organs will illustrate the procedure by which
republics should test international institutions and evaluate their actions.
The Charter itself was approved in the United States, France, and several
other republican governments through republican procedures. The
Charter's approval, through international instruments, tends to give the
organization a certain legitimacy. But this legitimacy does not exceed the
scope of the commitments made, or the authority of the nation's representatives. For example, ratification of the United Nations Charter in the
United States followed a vote by a greater than two-thirds majority in the
United States Senate' pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution." 6 Treaties and Laws made pursuant to the Constitu-
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See 1945 Cong. Rec. Senate 8134.
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tion- under the Authority of the United States, are the "supreme law of
the land" under the Constitution's sixth Article.'57 But this does not give
treaties the force to modify either constitutional guarantees or fundamental republican principles.
The principal organs of the United Nations include the General Assembly, the Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Organization
Secretariat.'5 8 The General Assembly consists of all the Members of the
United Nations, 59 which is to say a group including a great many nonrepublican states. Each state has one vote."W The General Assembly
may make recommendations to the Members and Security Council of the
United Nations, 6 ' approved by a simple majority vote, or by a twothirds majority in the case of "important questions."' 62 Such recommendations do not necessarily carry any weight, even under the terms of the
United Nations Charter. From a republican perspective, such recommendations should have influence only to the extent that General Assembly
votes reveal attitudes or provide a vehicle for deliberation among the
world's republican states. The views of non-republican governments will
sometimes provide useful insights into justice and the common good of
humanity, but only when those views are subject to verification by the
internal republican processes of republican nations.
The Security Council of the United Nations consists of fifteen members,' 63 five of whom are "permanent members," who must concur in all
substantive decisions of the Council."M France, Britain, and the United
States all enjoy substantially republican governments and permanent seats
on the Council, which give the Council's decisions considerable legitimate influence. But current distributions of power require that Council
majorities must rely on non-republican support. All members of the United Nations have agreed to "accept and carry out" the decisions of the

to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur", U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
157. U.S. CONST., art. VI: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
158. U.N. CHARTER art. 7.
159. Id. art. 9.
160. Id. art. 18, para. 1.
161.
Id. art. 10.
162.
Id. art. 18, para. 2.
163. Id. art. 23.
164. Id. art. 27, para. 3.
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Security Council."6 Republican members of the United Nations have
made this commitment after democratic deliberation. Even so, republics
that do not enjoy permanent membership on the Security Council may
find their interests overruled to placate big powers. And even permanent
members will sometimes face old Council resolutions which cannot be
reversed or altered due to recalcitrance by non-republican states. Explicit
commitments and the Council's structure give its decisions much more
authority than recommendations of the General Assembly. But even Security Council decisions remain subject to republican confirmation, in the
light of the composition and circumstances of Security Council majorities.
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations consists of
members elected by the General Assembly." This makes the Council
subject to the General Assembly's non-republican infirmities and very
unlikely to be a representative body. In any case, the Charter subordinates
the Council to the General Assembly,'67 and its draft conventions enter
into force only after ratification by independent states.' Commissions
established by the Economic and Social Council suffer from the same
restrictions."s Thus, the Council may become a useful locus of discussion and has been valuable in proposing conventions, including the Convention on Civil and Political Rights. But like the United Nations General
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council derives whatever authority it
has from the republican nature of its membership. Without such authority,
its proposals must stand or fall entirely upon their own merits. The same
is true of the now substantially defunct Trusteeship Council, with the
added complication that half the Council's members administer trust territories, creating obvious conflicts of interest.'
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations 7 and each member state undertakes to comply with
the Court's decisions to which it is a party." The Court may also issue
advisory opinions, requested by other organs or specialized agencies of
the United Nations. 3 Under its own statute, the Court's jurisdiction extends to cases that the parties refer to it, or to areas in which the parties
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recognize the court's compulsory jurisdiction by treaty or special declaration.17 Republican judges in republican nations have traditionally enjoyed enormous authority concerning both their own jurisdiction and the
content of the law.. The rule of law is a fundamental principle of republican government, 75 and has long been seen to require both judicial independence and security in office. 7 6 Judges on the International Court of
Justice, however, only serve for nine-year terms."7 They are elected by
the members of the Security Council and General Assembly,'78 by majority vote of each body, without a permanent member veto.'79 The subordination of the International Court of Justice to the General Assembly
and the home nations of the Court's various non-republican judges vitiates its independent force as an authority on international law. Whatever
authority the Court retains it derives by direct delegation from republican
nations. Republics need not defer when they disagree with the Court, particularly on issues of jurisdiction.
Finally, the United Nations Secretariat is appointed by the SecretaryGeneral under regulations established by the General Assembly.' The
Secretary-General is appointed in turn by the General Assembly upon the
recommendation of the Security Council.' Both bodies are tainted by
non-republican participation. This undermines the Secretariat's moral
authority. Republics properly support the United Nations Secretariat only
to the extent that it maintains high standards of efficiency, competence,
integrity, and its own independence from external authority.' The separate republican governments must themselves independently decide
whether this is the case.
None of the United Nations organs or instruments rest fully on the
legitimate republican basis of popular sovereignty. All organs submit in
part to non-republican control to the detriment of their moral authority.
The republican principles that support international law contradict certain
aspects of the United Nations regime and leave room for the separate
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deliberation of republican nations or, better still, for final determination
by a democratic federation of republican states.
XI.

CONCLUSION

A short review of the history and moral basis of international law
reveals its dependence from the beginning upon republican principles in
developing and defending legal doctrines and shared structures of legal
and political power. The task of international law, as of all law, is to
serve the common good of humanity, or at least the good of the relevant
political community. This implies popular sovereignty, the best known
test of moral truth and justice. National sovereignty may obscure this, but
only if one overlooks its own roots in the liberty and equality of nations.
National self-determination involves personal self-determination. Arguments for national liberty support the personal liberties of the state's subjects.
Immanuel Kant proposed a federation of republican states as the best
basis for a just law of nations, leading to perpetual peace. The dictates of
cultural history, human nature, and geographical variety require a diversity of nations. International law rests on this obvious truth and has developed legal categories that reflect social reality. "Nations" are cultural
units with a shared sense of justice and the common good. "States" are
political units, controlling a determinate territory. "Peoples" are the inhabitants of the different states. Every state should be a nation, and self-determining peoples help to make this so. Basic human rights are the fundamental freedoms without which no people can exercise its self-determination.
International law depends on the self-determination of peoples. Denying citizens a voice in the state destroys the republic and divides the
nation. Systematically repressed minorities deserve self-determination and
the opportunity to create a new people and a separate nation in pursuit of
the common good. Otherwise, international boundaries should be stable,
to provide the political basis for international law and national deliberation.
The republican principles of popular sovereignty and pursuit of the
common good created the underlying structure of international law. All
international institutions, including the United Nations and the several
sovereign states, deserve deference only to the extent that they respect the
public interest. Without democracy there can be no security. Republics
are the only safe and stable basis for a just law of nations. Without justice, there will be no peace.

